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RMP Compliance
Abstract
After the Clean Air Act Amendments became finalized in 1996, the subsequent requirement of Risk
Management Plan (RMP) submission by certain large chemical facilities to the EPA was mandated within 3
years. Because of the complexity of many environmental regulations on facilities and the natural gap created
by different levels (and agencies) of Government, total compliance with this most important emergency
planning regulation could not be verified. This project is meant to assist in bridging the gap between the Local
and State knowledge of facility information and assisting the EPA in identifying all potential RMP facilities.
By sharing information in both directions, the hope is also to narrow the gap among emergency planning
entities to ultimately make the community a safer place.
Comments
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Environmental Studies 2006.
This thesis or dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/mes_capstones/2
1Stephen T. Roth 
Envs 632  
04/14/04 
 
RMP COMPLIANCE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
After the Clean Air Act Amendments became finalized in 1996, the subsequent 
requirement of Risk Management Plan (RMP) submission by certain large chemical facilities to 
the EPA1 was mandated within 3 years.  Because of the complexity of many environmental 
regulations on facilities and the natural gap created by different levels (and agencies) of 
Government, total compliance with this most important emergency planning regulation could not 
be verified.  My project is meant to assist in bridging the gap between the Local and State 
knowledge of facility information and assisting the EPA in identifying all potential RMP 
facilities.  By sharing information in both directions, my hope is also to narrow the gap among 
emergency planning entities to ultimately make the community a safer place.    
 In conjunction with the Philadelphia Fire Department, HazMat Administrative Unit 
(HMAU), my project initially involves working with the Chemical Emergency Preparedness and 
Prevention Office (CEPPO) of the EPA Region III2 to ensure maximum facility compliance for 
Risk Management Plans for the city/county of Philadelphia.    After acquiring the entire chemical 
database from the HMAU, 3 we broke down the facilities in a manageable format and proceeded 
to contact the numerous companies listed to confirm or make certain that quantities were correct 
on the SARA forms. Although other informational sources were utilized and considered, this 
database proved to be the most fruitful.  Using techniques and data analysis compiled from this 
 
1 United States Environmental Protection Agency; the branch of the Federal Government charged with 
implementing the CAAA. 
2 EPA region III is the geographical area comprised of PA, MD, DEL, VA, W VA & Wash DC 
3 Listing of all facilities that filed “Tier II” chemical inventory forms that are required by the Superfund 
Amendments & Re-authorization Act (SARA –Title III) of 1986. 
2effort, we hope to apply lessons learned to use for the remainder of the State and Region III to 
assist in attaining 100% compliance of RMP throughout the region. 
INTRODUCTION: 
 Thirty years ago, I was assigned to the firehouse, Engine 29, as a new, rookie Fireman 
straight out of Fire school, at 4th St & Girard Ave. in the Northern liberties section of 
Philadelphia.  Besides being almost overwhelmed by the constant action that this busy station 
afforded me, there was something that made an even deeper impression on my psyche, which 
molded much of my thinking today.  In the rear of the apparatus floor, there was a trophy case 
commemorating one of the most tragic fires that ever occurred in the Philadelphia Fire 
Department history.  There were seven helmets, which were worn by the brave Philadelphia 
Firemen, who succumbed to a fire and explosion that happened in the Berg chemical factory at 
5th & Berks Sts. in North Philadelphia in 19544. As a result of this fire, the City of Philadelphia 
established the famous Thrill show and subsequent “Hero Scholarship Fund,” which attempts to 
compensate the surviving families for their loss due to this event and any other Police or Fireman 
family that suffers this supreme sacrifice. 
 I spent many an agonizing night thinking how these deaths may have been prevented and 
although the job of a firefighter is inherently dangerous, these lives could have been saved.  One 
of the many benefits that have come from this country’s environmental regulations is safety 
precautions that chemical facilities must enact to prevent accidents in their workplace.  Coupled 
with the pre-planning requirements that the emergency response community bears in conjunction 
with the facility, many unknown hazards (such as the alien chemical mixture in the tank at the 
Berg laboratories) have been eliminated.  When I fast-forwarded twenty years later as a 
 
4 See www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/8010427.htm for recent historical account entitled “They Died For Us” 
3Hazardous Material (HazMat) Lieutenant, I was charged with the responsibility to act as the 
“SARA”5 coordinator for the Fire Department, and thus became an avid inspector, vigilantly 
looking for these potential hazardous facility locations.  Ever since I entered the MES program, I 
assumed that I would be working on some type of Capstone that would be linked to my 
background; this project fits the bill perfectly. 
 During my previous experience as a HazMat investigator and SARA Title III  
Coordinator for the Philadelphia Fire Department, I saw the need for cooperation and assistance 
between the Federal EPA and local agencies.  Specifically, when the requirements for the Clean 
Air Act Amendments (CAAA) Risk Management Plans (RMP) were finalized in June 1996, I 
knew there had to be some bridging of regulatory philosophies in order to accomplish the 
ultimate goal of total compliance of all RMP facilities.  Thus, being a former and current 
member of the Philadelphia and Chester County Local Emergency Planning Committees 
(LEPC), I felt that I had the right background to provide a conduit to assist all affected entities.  
This project and subsequent Capstone thesis should provide a “win-win-win” situation that 
should benefit everyone.  Not only should this meet my client’s needs of compliance, but the 
RMP info should enhance the future emergency planning requirements for these facilities that 
can assist the LEPC and the Fire Department. 
DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT: 
Working with my Client (EPA, Region 3, CEPPO office), we hope to have identified any 
potential facility that is required to file Risk Management Plans in the Philadelphia area.  Along 
with the ultimate goal of ensuring 100% compliance in the City of Philadelphia (the goal of my 
client), an analysis was developed to determine the types of facilities that have already filed, 
 
5 Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
4along with their respective chemical inventories.  We will then develop a template of knowing 
which facilities to target as we proceed along to this final capstone.  While performing this 
analysis, all information will be updated and shared in both directions with the Fire Department 
HMAU,6 LEPC and the EPA. 
CLIENT MISSION: 
EPA's Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO) provides 
leadership, builds partnerships, and offers technical assistance to: prevent and prepare for 
chemical emergencies; respond to environmental crises; inform the public about chemical 
hazards in their community; and share lessons learned about chemical accidents.7 EPA’s Region 
III office, based in downtown Philadelphia @ 1650 Arch St., has as its’ CEPPO chief, Mr. Jerry 
Heston.  His team of Perry Pandya (Ch E), Jennifer Shoemaker (Ch E, PM), Mike Welsh (PE, 
OSC), Al Baginski (PE, DEE) and Bill McHale (PE)8 are assisting in this initiative. 
HISTORY:  
Ever since the catastrophic, toxic release of Methyl Isocyanate at a Union Carbide plant 
in Bhopal, India in December, 1984, which killed over 2,000 people and injured thousands 
others, there has been a strong federal government movement in this country to protect against 
this kind of event ever happening in the United States.  As a result, initially in 1986, Congress 
enacted SARA Title III, aka, EPCRA9, which mandated facilities to report chemical storage 
above certain thresholds to three (3) distinct entities:  Fire Departments, LEPC’s10 and the State 
Emergency Response Commission (SERC).  This reporting mechanism served as the basis for 
 
6 Phila. Fire Dept’s. Hazardous Material Administrative Unit-the unit that processes SARA Tier II forms 
7 http: yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/mission.htm 
8 Because of budget cutbacks, Mr. Pandya & Baginski were not available during the latter part of the project 
9 Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act 
10 SARA also created LEPC’s, which were made up of representatives of industry, government and related entities 
affecting the community 
5chemical emergency preparedness.  When LEPC’s received this information from facilities on 
“Tier II” forms, companies that showed Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS’s) above 
respective thresholds11, needed to have an “Off-site” emergency response plan formulated by the 
committees.  These “worse case scenario” plans gave a footprint into the community of a toxic 
material release and describe how the emergency response community would have handled a 
release. 
 In 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) were passed and initiated a 
requirement for facilities who had very large quantities of certain toxics and flammables12 to 
develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP), based on their “Off-site consequence analysis” of a 
release of a chemical in process.  This requirement was not finalized until June 1996, and it gave 
facilities three years to comply.  In addition to requiring facilities to develop release response and 
prevention activities, it also mandated facilities to send their RMP’s into EPA for review and 
initially required community unveiling, which was later scaled back because of Terrorism 
awareness.  What is significant to note is that many SARA chemicals (although not all) are also 
RMP chemicals, but the thresholds are much higher for RMP filing.13 The other significant point 
of these two comparisons is where this information is required to be filed.  Tier II chemical 
inventory forms are sent on an annual basis to three Local and State government representatives; 
RMP information is sent to the Federal EPA.  Now one can understand why a BRIDGE must be 
formed to combine the compliance efforts and benefit from each one’s informational base. 
 
11 40 CFR, part 355, appendices A & B contains the listing of EHS’s and related Threshold Planning Quantities  
12 40 CFR, part 68 delineates provisions for these 77 acutely toxics and 63 flammables.  
13 A listing of both chemical criteria can be found in EPA’s publication: “List of Lists”, Oct. 2001.  See: 
www.epa.gov.ceppo  
6INITIAL ACTIVITIES:
For this project, we identified all potential RMP facilities in Philadelphia by mid-
November and followed-up with verification by the first week of December.  Concurrent with 
the compliance issue, an analysis was developed as a prediction for future RMP projects.  The 
following are the initial steps taken: 
• Visited the region 3 reading room14 to identify all current RMP’s listed on EPA’s national 
database.  This database, dated June 2003, listed approximately 20 facilities, some of 
which I knew had previously gone out of business. 
• Several phone calls were made to CEPPO to set up a series of meetings (roughly every 2 
weeks) beginning on Sept. 30th, to discuss strategies.  The initial meeting unveiled the 
more current RMP database from CEPPO, which had only 16 facilities listed.  After 
consulting with the Fire Department, I later informed CEPPO that two had “downsized” 
their inventory, leaving only 14 current RMP facilities for the county. 
• A meeting was convened with the Phila. Fire Dept. / HMAU to discuss this project and 
obtain their “SARA” Database.   Of the more than 400 facilities identified, over 140 
contain Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS’s) above their thresholds, while the 
remainder has other hazardous substances more than 10,000 lbs.  All of the 
approximately 360 EHS’s established by SARA are by definition, extremely toxic, and 
thus are a good barometer for the toxics list for RMP.  The remaining RMP flammable 
category and some other toxics may be found in the SARA category of other hazardous 
substances over 10,000 lb.  Also, as part of this initiative, I offered my assistance to the 
HMAU for any future Emergency planning issues stemming from our results. 
 
14 Located in the EPA bldg. @ 1650 Arch St. 
7• During the November PLEPC bi-monthly meeting, Mr. Heston and I informed the 
committee of our initiative. 
• In subsequent meetings with CEPPO, we agreed to divide the SARA list up and 
attempted to compare both criteria.  From there, a rough list was developed for further 
research. 
METHOD OF RESEARCH/SOURCES OF DATA:
Using the list of toxics and flammables provided by EPA, we compared this list to the 
SARA database from the PFD.  Because SARA requires only a reporting range and not an exact 
amount, there is some question whether the proper thresholds are being met.  A potential list of 
approximately 15 facilities was created that may be RMP facilities due to the SARA range 
within RMP thresholds.  Another 20 companies have the potential chemicals, but show below the 
range.  In both cases, these needed further verification.  Another possible inadequacy with SARA 
is that the information is already dated when it is received.  SARA, Tier II forms are due on 
March 1st every year, for chemicals that were on hand the previous year.  As one can see, this is 
one possible inadequate source of data to be resolved. 
Another inadequate source is the OSHA database of Process Safety Management 
(PSM).15 Many similar chemical thresholds and subsequent requirements exist for PSM 
facilities and RMP’s.  The main problem is that OSHA does not have a central database of filers; 
they mandate hazard analysis in their processes, but the records remain on site, not sent to 
OSHA.  After several inquiry attempts, I successfully found that the only real listing that’s 
available as public information is the list of facilities that had been cited for non-compliance of 
PSM’s after an OSHA inspection was conducted.  Even though this may only be a partial list, 
 
15 See 29 CFR 1910.119 promulgated by the Occupational Safety & Health Administration of the U.S. Dept. Of 
Labor 
8some information is better than none.  By citing the Freedom of Information Act,16 I wrote a 
formal letter to the regional Administrator requesting this information for the entire region III of 
OSHA, which takes in the same States as EPA’s region III.  In January, I received a reply listing 
all facilities in region 3 of OSHA that have been cited for PSM violations due to an inspection 
since 1990.  This “limited” list will be reviewed against the SARA list.    
Other sources of information that EPA has used in the past are the other databases that 
are compiled on their website known as “Envirofacts.”17 These databases integrate many 
previous regulatory efforts by EPA into one central location that can be used to compare 
facilities that generate hazardous waste, emit toxics into the environment, or have permits for 
other concerns.  This information was previously reviewed by EPA/CEPPO, but may be revisited 
as the need arises. 
ANALYSIS: 
Applying the “Environmental Management” class lesson on environmental indicators to 
this project, one might feel that this command and control project is dealing strictly with low-
level regulatory inputs.  Actually, because health and safety issues are at the core of the 
emergency planning process, the highest priority to protect responders and the community in 
general ensures prime value to this project.  It also serves as a confidence builder, knowing that 
much is being done to keep our community safe, and should an emergency arise, the potential for 
saving unnecessary injuries and deaths may never actually be measured, but is priceless.   
 If one wanted to prioritize the potential risk of these facilities, there are a few barometers 
that could be met when dealing with the specific chemicals.  One category of poisonous 
chemicals has assigned values for RMP known as “toxic endpoints.”  These can be defined as the 
 
16 Passed by congress in 1966 and amended in 1974. 
17 See www.epa.gov/enviro 
9maximum airborne concentration below which is believed individuals could be exposed to for up 
to one hour without experiencing serious health effects.18 This is part of the “dose-response” 
assessment when EPA looks at Risk Characterization.  The other category of RMP chemicals is 
the flammables.  All of these materials must have a National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA)19 rating of 4 for flammability, which is the highest degree of hazard because of having 
liquid flashpoints below 73 degrees F. and boiling points below 100 degrees F.  The potential of 
these flammables is calculated based on the 1 lb. overpressure distance of the vapor cloud 
explosion. 
 Another potential method of prioritizing the risk associated with these highly hazardous 
substances is to compare the “Threshold Quantities” that EPA assigns to RMP toxics.  For the 77 
acutely toxic materials, there is a range from a low of 500 lbs. (assigned to the chemical 
Phosgene, which has been identified as a potential chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
WMD),20 to the high of 20,000 lbs. (for Ammonium Hydroxide and nine other somewhat less 
toxic materials). 
For our purposes on this immediate project, any SARA facility that meets the criteria for 
RMP in Philadelphia will be studied equally.  The number of facilities is not that great and 
meeting the already large criteria puts all of these companies in a risk class by themselves; EPA 
assigns a high “threshold” for disclosure on RMP’s for these potent chemicals. 21 
18 According to the Emergency Response Planning Guideline 2 (ERPG-2) developed by the American Industrial 
Hygiene Association 
19 National Fire Protection Association 704 Standard for Identification of Hazards of Materials 
20 As determined by the Dept. of Justice; see Law Enforcement Response to WMD, a 16 hr. course geared to the 
Police response community, DOJ/LSU 
21 See “List of Lists”, last column entitled “CAA 112® TQ” 
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CURRENT RMP DATA: 
 The most current data on file at CEPPO for Philadelphia lists the following chemicals, 
and I have them ranked by their toxic endpoints: 
Hazardous Substance # of Facilities  Toxic Endpoint 
Chlorine    3   (.0087) 
Oleum    2 (.010) 
Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) 1 (.016) 
Hydrochloric Acid (HCL) 1 (.026) 
Anhydrous Ammonia 7 (.14) 
An interesting coincidence with these 14 chemicals is that they all are considered 
“corrosives”; which is the effect they have on moist human tissue when one comes in contact 
with them.  Not every “EHS” is toxic by its caustic effect on the body; some exhibit poisonous 
effects through other methods. 
Note that Anhydrous Ammonia and Chlorine comprise 10 of the 14 (71%) of the total 
facilities.  According to our CEPPO office, this is slightly less than the national average, which is 
approximately 80%.  This information will be useful as we proceed to the remainder of the State 
and region.     
An analysis of the type of RMP facilities shows most of the Anhydrous Ammonia22 
facilities are cold storage food warehouses, while one is the main distributor of Ammonia in this 
area.  The three Chlorine facilities are water treatment plants, which eventually are planning to 
 
22 Anhydrous Ammonia is 100% gaseous Ammonia without water 
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switch to a weaker solution of Sodium Hypochlorite23; this future action will eventually de-list 
them from RMP requirements.  The remaining four are:  2 chemical distributors, 1 pesticide 
distributor, and 1 refinery.   
Clearly, based on the toxic endpoint, Chlorine would be the riskiest chemical to the 
community and thus would have the largest impact for a potential release area.  Another 
important fact about Chlorine is the type of container that is used to transport it.  Generally, one 
will find Chlorine either in “1 ton containers” or 90-ton rail cars.  A release from either one of 
these pressurized vessels will generally only get worse because of the corrosive effect of the 
hydrochloric acid24; therefore an impact area will be affected in less time than many other 
chemicals.   The cold storage facilities would pose the least risk among the RMP facilities, not 
only because of the higher toxic endpoint, but also because Anhydrous Ammonia has a very low 
odor threshold.  When the average person begins to detect Ammonia odor, they generally have 
plenty of time to escape before they succumb to its hazardous effects.25 
23 Sodium Hypochlorite contains approx. 12.5% Chlorine in solution 
24 Hydrochloric acid is formed when water comes in contact with Chlorine gas. 
25 Odor detectable by most people is 25 ppm, according to “Emergency Response to Ammonia Incidents”, 
PFD/HMAU, Dec. 1993 
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REGION III RMP DATA: 
As a comparison to these 14 facilities in Philadelphia, the following other information is 
shown for the rest of the region (by State): 
PA = 418 
VA = 187 
MD = 124 
W VA = 86 
DEL = 37 
DC = 2
RMP’S IN REGION 3 (as of 11/03)     (854 Total)26 
26 From the Ceppo “intranet” info at EPA region III 
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(In Nov.1999, EPA listed a total of 16,517 RMP’s nationwide in their Envirofacts database on 
the Internet; 468 in PA).27 
POTENTIAL FACILITIES: 
The following represents Hazardous Substances that have been reported on SARA forms 
by facilities that have the potential threshold criteria for RMP: 28 
TOXICS: Hydrochloric Acid (HCL), Hydrofluoric Acid (HF), Nitric Acid, and 
Ammonium Hydroxide 
FLAMMABLES: Ethylene, Dimethylamine (Propane has been also listed on many Tier II 
forms, but recently has been exempted from RMP’s if used as fuel)29 
FINDINGS:
The flammable Ethylene, which is the primary component in Natural Gas, is also 
exempted from RMP’s for similar reasons as Propane; it is being held for sale as a fuel.  The 
facility using Dimethylamine was determined to have incorrectly over-reported their quantity of 
this product on their Tier II form; they had less than 10,000 lbs. 
The toxics breakdown was as follows: 
• 6 Facilities had HCL, but their total aggregate was less than 15,000 lbs., which is 
the RMP threshold.  The quantity must be more than a 37% concentration and 
then you need to reach the above threshold.  Ironically, HCL was de-listed from 
SARA EHS thresholds shortly after SARA was enacted, due to strong industry 
lobbyist efforts. 
 
27 From www.epa.gov/ceppo, which has since been removed from the public eye due to Terrorism concerns 
28 On the tier II form, the range indicated for most of these substances was between 10,000 & 100,000 lbs.; while for 
HF the range was 1,000 to 10,000 lbs.  RMP criteria doesn’t use ranges, it‘s more specific. 
29 This exemption is due to lobbyists arguing that many facilities use Propane only as a backup for fuel shortage 
supplies in extreme weather and or other unusual circumstances.  
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• 6 Facilities had Ammonia Hydroxide30 and although they appeared to reach the 
thresholds, the percentage of Ammonia in water needed to be greater than 20 and 
it had to exceed 20,000 lbs.  This threshold was not met. 
• 1 Facility had Nitric Acid greater than 15,000 lbs., but not at the 80% or greater 
mixture that RMP’s mandate. 
• 1 Facility had HF above the 1,000 lb. threshold, but not at the required 50% 
mixture.  
All of these toxics were also “corrosives.” 
NOTE:  Due to new security concerns after 9-11, the facility information cannot be 
openly disclosed to the general public, although all of our emergency entities involved will be 
given the entire information, if desired.  Although we cannot use specific company names, the 
following represents the type of facilities that use the corresponding Chemicals: 
 
TOXICS
Ammon.Hydroxide  HCL   Nitric Acid  HF 
Paper company  Chem. dist  Chem. distributor Auto clean. supplier 
Water treatment  Electric parts    
Container mfr   Metal refinisher 
Steam energy supplier Rail yard 
Cleaner mfr/dist  Cleaner mfr/dist 
Chemical distributor  Paper co. 
30 Ammonium Hydroxide is the dilute form of Ammonia in a solution of water.  This is considered a strong caustic 
material. 
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FLAMMABLES
Ethylene    Dimethylamine
Gas company   Chemical distributor 
CHEMICALS (Facilities) w/in RMP range
Ammonia Hydroxide, 6, 
40%%
HCL,6, 40%
Nitric Acid, 1, 5%
HF, 1, 5%
Ethylene, 1, 5%
Dimethylamine, 1, 5%
Ammonia Hydroxide HCL Nitric Acid HF Ethylene Dimethylamine
FACILITIES LISTING RMP CHEMICALS ON THEIR TIER II, 
BUT SHOWING BELOW RANGE 
The following Hazardous substances are from facilities that indicated RMP chemicals in 
the range below the RMP criteria; we determined we needed to verify this information to make 
certain.  Even though all facilities fell below the requirements, many were close enough to 
ascertain total storage.  
16
Hazardous Substance  RMP Threshold  # of Facilities
Anhydrous Ammonia   10,000 lbs.   7  
Nitric Acid     15,000 lbs.   4 
Formaldehyde    15,000 lbs.   2 
Hydrofluoric Acid   1,000 lbs.   2 
Chlorine    2,500 lbs.   1 
Hydrochloric Acid   15,000 lbs.   1 
Acetylene    10,000 lbs.   1 
Cyclohexanone   10,000 lbs.   1    
Even though all of the above facilities indicated lower quantities than the RMP threshold, 
it was important to ascertain exact amounts because of some prior knowledge about how 
facilities report chemicals.  Sometimes there is confusion of how long a substance must be on 
Facilities w/ Chemicals below TPQ
Ammonia, 7
Nitric Acid, 4
Formaldehyde, 2 HF, 2
Chlorine, 1
HCL, 1
Acetylene, 1
Cyclohexanone, 1
Other, 3
Ammonia
Nitric Acid
Formaldehyde
HF
Chlorine
HCL
Acetylene
Cyclohexanone
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hand in order to report it on a Tier II.  Even if a material is there for one minute, it also qualifies 
for storage requirements.  By double-checking with these facilities, we were also letting them 
know the potential for any future compliance requirements, should they decide to increase their 
inventory. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR PHILADELPHIA COUNTY: 
 As the above data makes evident, despite placing all of the facilities under a microscope, 
we were unable to find any that were not already in compliance with our regulatory effort.  At 
face value, it would appear that this initiative was not necessary, but in actuality, there can be 
many benefits that came from our efforts.  First of all, much information has been updated from 
both the RMP facilities and from some SARA facilities.  We have shared these updates with the 
affected entities.  It has also become evident that through the efforts of many concerned groups 
such as the PLEPC, the PFD/HMAU and region III of EPA, a great deal of information has been 
disseminated to facilities throughout this county and the subsequent messages have been 
received.  This confirms that this region has been successful in accomplishing its mission, and 
our efforts have validated this point.  During the years following the SARA mandates, the 
HMAU and the PLEPC, coupled with the enforcement actions of EPA/CEPPO were extremely 
pro-active in trying to identify all possible chemical facilities.  Making them aware of 
environmental regulations in general, probably helped to keep them abreast of the newer laws 
such as the Clean Air Act Amendments’ RMP.  Our project has also helped to ensure 
cooperation between different government levels, which can be invaluable during a subsequent 
emergency. 
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FUTURE BENEFITS: 
As we proceed forward to study the remainder of PA and region III, there have been 
some concrete analysis factors that can be used.  First, the exact percentage of certain substances 
is especially vital when it comes to RMP compliance issues.  With SARA, once specific 
substances were identified, the only other real criterion for compliance issues was the total 
quantity that could be found at any one time.  Secondly, percentage of substances was not nearly 
as important as with the RMP corrosives.  Whether through shear accident or if this was 
purposely planned, there are built-in incentives by EPA to reduce inventory of hazardous 
substances.  Either by keeping percentages down or reducing of inventory, many facilities can 
eliminate the need for sometimes-expensive compliance paperwork.  In the long run, this is also 
beneficial to the community because they will not need to be concerned about a large hazardous 
release. 
 Looking at our current and potential RMP facilities, there are common prime, potential 
other companies that can be looked at as a first priority when we go outside of Philadelphia 
County.  It’s apparent that all cold storage facilities, water treatment plants and chemical 
distributors should all be scrutinized to make sure their inventories are identified.  We can also 
compare some of the similar smaller companies that came close to the threshold in Philadelphia; 
in a larger rural area, space isn’t as much of a premium and therefore inventories may be larger. 
Looking at the remainder of the State, there are some specific informational sources that 
need to be studied.  Instead of contacting each one of the 67 individual LEPC’s associated with 
each county of PA, we will go over the SARA information that was sent to “Pennsafe” (State of 
PA entity that receives a copy of the Tier II form).  In January, EPA contacted this PA 
Department of Labor and Industry division, requesting all of the Tier II information that was sent 
19
to the State, in order to sift out the Extremely Hazardous Substances and any extremely 
flammables.  Because of the large volume of information, Pennsafe suggested to just look at two 
major possible RMP chemicals, and compare this listing to what already has been filed.  In the 
future, we can then look at other RMP chemicals that have been filed on Tier II forms, 
prioritizing them based on quantities disclosed.   
We have recently received a 62-page report listing all of the facilities in the State that file 
Tier II forms for either Chlorine or Anhydrous Ammonia.  Of the over 1,000 facilities31 that 
reported, 113 are listed having Anhydrous Ammonia over 10,000 lbs.  Assuming that this 
information is still accurate, and because this is the threshold for RMP purposes, we can make 
the assumption that this is the same number of facilities required to file RMP’s based on 
Ammonia.  The number of Chlorine facilities that reported having quantities exceeding 1,000 
lbs. numbered 210.  Remembering that the RMP threshold is 2500 lbs., we can make the 
assumption that some of these facilities may exceed the threshold, although some may not.  This 
listing needs further investigation. 
 
31 This 1,000 facility number is only an approximate value that is estimated because we don’t have the entire 
database  
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PA "Tier II" Facility list
1,000
113 2100
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
# of Tier II facilities
w/NH3 or Cl2
# of NH3 over 10,000
lbs.
# of Cl2 facilities over
1,000 lbs.
Ammonia &  Chlorine
From this listing of Ammonia and Chlorine facilities, we will then compare the current 
RMP database in region 3.  This comparison should give us a fairly accurate listing of any 
potential non-compliance facilities.  While EPA has not made a final decision on how they will 
enforce any non-compliance, these facilities will definitely be put on notice of their 
responsibilities for RMP’s. 
 Another central database source from the State of PA would be the listing of “Off-site” 
plan facilities that reside with the PA Emergency Management Agency (PEMA).  These plans, 
which are submitted to PEMA for approval, by each individual county, should list all facilities 
that have Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) above their respective thresholds for 
Emergency planning purposes.  Keep in mind that not all Tier II substances are considered 
extremely hazardous, only the over 300 that are listed in the section 302 column of the List of 
lists.  This database from PEMA should delineate more specifically a narrower range for both 
Chlorine and Ammonia, thereby helping to determine whether the facility is over the threshold. 
We were hoping that once this information was received, not only can we narrow down 
the field of Chlorine users that are over 2500 lbs., but also we can then begin to search the other 
RMP toxic substances listing.  Even though we were verbally informed by PEMA that this info 
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was obtainable, we received a recent E-mail from them explaining that we must go through each 
individual LEPC to get specific “Off-site” plan chemical info.  Based on this new information, a 
new strategy needs to be considered.  Perhaps, possibly sending questionnaires of general RMP 
information to LEPC’s and in turn, informing them of the EPA information available to them. 
Until this information is received, the current strategy by the CEPPO office is to take the 
Tier II information and compare what Ammonia and Chlorine facilities definitely report over the 
RMP thresholds and then compare this list to those that have already filed RMP’s.  Based on this 
diligent comparison performed by CEPPO, 20 facilities were identified as being remiss.  CEPPO 
has determined to issue these facilities a 15-day response letter that mandates that they answer 
the informational request or are subject to fines/penalties under the Clean Air Act.       
Some other possible sources that should be considered in the future are any local Fire 
Department and Hazardous Material Units records and related industry suppliers and 
associations.32 I am sure as we start looking at other counties, there may be specific industries 
that are indigenous to them, that may have their own type of toxics and/or flammables.  We’ll 
have to study them on a case-by-case basis.  Also, if needed, each individual county can be 
contacted to verify the same information that was sent to the State, although this process could 
be very labor intensive and for our purposes, may not be an effective management of time.33 
One could also look at any of these databases for facility types (e.g. chemical distributors). 
For the remainder of this region, and as a blueprint for any other region’s efforts to 
attempt this same initiative, I am including a crosswalk checklist as an appendix to easily assist 
others in possible identifications.  Because these RMP plans need to be updated every 5 years, 
this is an especially good time to send out information to all potential facilities.  Not only will 
 
32 Each 1 of 67 counties in the State of PA must have their own HazMat response unit, or 1 on retainer that could 
respond with/in 2 hours  
33 By soliciting individual LEPC’s, an incentive of information sharing can be utilized 
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information serve as a reminder to current compliers, but also a tickler will help to bring any 
facilities that “sit on the bubble.”  
SUMMARY: 
 In addition to meeting my client’s goal of total RMP compliance, I feel many benefits 
will come of this initiative.  Besides the interactive cooperation that needs to continually 
transpire between governmental agencies, information sharing both ways will yield some 
expected and unexpected results. When emergency response entities plan together, a smoother 
experience results should the real emergency happen.  Obviously, this effort has served as a 
blueprint for our future endeavors; hopefully it can be useful to others who need to accomplish 
similar goals.  
FINAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Because most of the individual LEPC’s have an intimate knowledge of what is in their 
planning districts, it may be advantageous to enlist their assistance in this endeavor.  If we can 
provide some incentive to them to assist us, they may be more apt to be diligent about their 
investigation.  If we provide them some educational tools to assist us (e.g. giving them a current 
listing of the facilities in their counties, providing them RMP info and thresholds, and showing 
them how this could help them in their planning process), they may want to be proactive to bring 
all of their potential non-compliers on line.  Because many LEPC’s are understaffed and strictly 
volunteer, this may be easier said than done, but it is worth the effort to at least try, if it hasn’t 
already been done.  Also, because of the political arena involved with some localities, this just 
may not be possible.    
 We have just been informed that effective April 9, 2004, the new rule has been signed by 
the EPA administrator, amending the submission and data requirements for the RMP program.  
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As part of this rulemaking, EPA has clarified specific 5-year deadline requirements for the 
updating of RMP’s.  This rulemaking can be an opportune time to seek the LEPC help, by 
informing them of these requirements and asking them if they would like to send out information 
to their respective facilities.  We plan to do just that in Philadelphia.   
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APPENDIX “A”
(CHECKLIST FOR RMP SEARCH) 
 
• Research current “Envirofacts” from EPA website 
• Acquire “Tier II” database from State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) 
o If necessary, individual counties may need to be contacted for verification 
• Acquire “Off-Site plan” database from SERC (If possible) 
o If necessary, individual counties may need to be contacted for verification 
• Acquire corresponding OSHA region’s PSM inspection database 
• Using RMP criteria for toxics AND flammables, compare above info  
• If necessary, verification with facilities may be made either through phone calls, 
informational letters (preferably certified mail) or through site inspections 
• Additional cross-referencing can be made with local Fire Departments, Hazardous 
Material Response Units, or other local entities that have jurisdiction over chemical 
storage, use or discharges (e.g. Water, Air, Health, &/or License Depts.) 
• Other potential cross-referencing could be accomplished through trade associations, 
chemical suppliers or “non-government associations” (NGO’s) that may have 
information for other purposes 
• Send out 5 year update information (due in 2004) to both previous filers & potential 
future filers to bring everyone into the fold 
• Enlist LEPC’s assistance wherever possible 
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